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Appellant Michael D. Ferguson (“Michael”), by and through his attorneys of record,

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn

& Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submits his Appellant’s Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case.
This

is

an action wherein Michael sought an order compelling the successor trustees 0f

The Roger and Sybil Ferguson Family Revocable
October

14,

Trust, dated

May

amended 0n

23, 1994, as

201 1, (the “Trust”), t0 allow him access t0 ﬁnancial and administrative records 0f the

Trust, of which

Michael

is

a beneﬁciary.

The Trust was

established

by Michael’s

parents,

and Sybil Ferguson (respectively “Roger” and “Sybil”), whose multi-million-dollar

Roger

estate

was

located in Idaho and Arizona. Speciﬁcally, Michael sought access t0 Trust records in his capacity
as a beneﬁciary of

one of the Trust’s sub-trusts (the “Survivor’s Trust”). Michael sought access

t0 the Trust records

based upon Idaho Code

§

which requires a

15-7-303(c),

trustee,

upon

reasonable request, t0 provide beneﬁciaries “with relevant information about the assets 0f the trust

and the particulars relating

t0 the administration.”

similar provision requiring the trustee to

Section 18.10 of the Trust also contained a

make “ﬁnancial

available to beneficiaries,” provided the information

records and documentation of the Trust

was

“directly applicable t0 the beneﬁciary

receiving the information.” Michael sought such records t0 determine ifthe Survivor’ s Trust assets

had been correctly allocated and administered.

The Respondents
accountant, Steven

became

J.

(R., p.

247

(11

21)).

are three 0f Michael’s siblings (“the Sibling Trustees”)

and a family

Hart (collectively referred t0 hereafter as “Successor Trustees”),

the successor co-trustees 0f the Trust (and each 0f its sub-trusts)
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upon

all

ofwhom

Sybil’s death.

The

Successor Trustees refused to allow Michael access to any Trust records kept prior t0 Sybil’s death

based 0n their contention that since Michael was not originally a beneﬁciary 0f the Trust, he was
not entitled to review Trust records kept prior t0 Sybil’s death. However, approximately 19 months
prior t0 her death, Sybil exercised a

0f the Survivor’s Trust.
that as a Trust

power 0f appointment that designated Michael

(R., p. 865).

Regardless

as a beneﬁciary

ofwhen he became a beneﬁciary, Michael argued

beneﬁciary he was entitled to review “relevant” Trust Records in order t0 determine

his rightful share

0f Trust

assets.

Idaho Code

Due t0 the Successor Trustees’

§ 15-7-303(b); (see R., p.

refusal t0 allow

Michael access

294

(Trust, § 18.10)).

t0 Trust records concerning

Sybil’s administration 0f the Trust prior t0 her death, Michael ﬁled a creditor’s claim in the

Arizona probate 0f Sybil’s

estate,

where the Sibling Trustees served as co-personal representatives.

After the claim was denied, Michael ﬁled a Petition for Allowance 0f the Claim and Stay (the

“Arizona Petition”), in order t0 prevent any claim with respect
Trust from being barred under Arizona law.

(R., p. 472).

t0 Sybil’s administration

When

the Arizona Petition

the parties stipulated to stay those proceedings, pending resolution of this action.

0f the

was

(R., p. 602).

Following Michael’s ﬁling of the Arizona Petition, which occurred approximately ten months
this action

was

after

ﬁled, the Successor Trustees added an additional afﬁrmative defense to their

Answer and ﬁled
Trust, based

ﬁled,

upon

a Declaratory Judgment action seeking forfeiture 0f Michael’s interest in the

§ 20.03

The primary
Michael was entitled

of the Trust (the “Forfeiture Clause”).

issues in this appeal focus

t0

upon

i)

Whether as a beneﬁciary 0f the Trust,

review “relevant” Trust records, and

ii)

whether the Forfeiture Clause

enforceable under the circumstances present in this case.
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is

Statement 0f Facts

II.

Roger and Sybil established the Trust 0n
on October

the Trust

the parents of Lois C.

264

(R., p. 261).

Under

Article

Two

1994. (R., p. 256).

Roger and Sybil

Webb, Wade Ferguson,

(Trust, Art. TW0)).

Andrew

201 1.

14,

May 23,

J.

They

later

are Michael’s parents

amended

and are also

Xarissa Koenig and Debbie F. Preece.1

of the Trust, Michael, his

sister

(R., p.

Debbie and her son,

Preece, were designated as “Omitted Persons” and were t0 be initially considered as

though they had predeceased Roger and Sybil Without descendants—i.e., they were disinherited.
(R., p.

264

(Trust, Art. Tw0)).

were nominated

The
its

Under

3.03(a) 0fthe Trust, Lois,

t0 serve as the Successor Trustees. (R., p.

Trust’s setup

was complex,

265

Wade,

Xarissa, and Steven

(Trust, § 3.03(a)); R., p.

utilizing various allocations

and sub-trusts

t0

247

J.

Hart

(11

4)).

accomplish

purposes. (See R., pp. 223-29 (Charting the organizational structure 0f the Trust)). Importantly,

the Trust speciﬁed that “after” the death 0f the ﬁrst 0f the grantor t0 die, the surviving grantor’s

separate property and one-half share 0f community property “shall be allocated to a separate Trust

[i.e.,

the Survivor's Trust] and shall be administered under Article Eight.”

§ 5.02)).2

grantor’s

as the

The Trust
(i.e.,

further directed that

upon the death of the

(R., p.

271 (Trust,

ﬁrst spouse t0 die, the deceased

Roger’s) separate property and one-half share of community property—referred t0

Deceased Grantor’s Trust Property—was

to

be further subdivided and administered under

various trusts established under Articles Seven and Nine through Thirteen 0f the Trust (referred t0
herein collectively as the “Marital Trusts”). (See R., pp. 271, 274 (Trust, §§ 5.02, 7.01)). Although

1

2

For the sake of simplicity,

all

0f Roger’s and Sybil’s children Will be referenced by their ﬁrst names.

The Trust did not specify a speciﬁc date by Which such

allocation

was

t0
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Michael and his

sister

Debbie

F.

Preece were “intentionally disinherited,” (R.,

Trustees were designated as beneﬁciaries 0f both the Survivor’s Trust and
Trusts. (See R., pp. 274-77,

Roger died on April
after

p. 264), the Sibling

some of the Marital

282-86 (Trust, §§ 7.01, 8.06, 11.06, 13.01)).
7,

2012. (R.,

p. 11

(1]

3); R., p.

132

(1]

2,)).

Approximately 18 months

Roger’s death, Sybil had a change 0f heart with respect t0 her prior decision t0 disinherit

Michael.
p. 3 10).

On

October

Under

§ 8.01

3,

2013, Sybil executed her Last Will and Testament (her “Will”).

(R.,

of her Will, Sybil exercised a general power 0f appointment for Michael’s

beneﬁt, as well as the Sibling Trustees and certain grandchildren 0f Sybil. (R., p. 315).

power of appointment was based upon a provision
Survivor’s Trust. (R., p. 277).

The Trust provided

Section 8.05 General

Sybil’s

in the Trust that pertained solely t0 the

as follows:

Power of Appointment

have the power t0 appoint all 0r any portion of
the principal and undistributed net income remaining in the Survivor’s Trust
at the surviving Grantor’s death among one 0r more persons 0r entities,
including creditors of the surviving Grantor's estate. The surviving Grantor
shall have the sole and exclusive right t0 exercise this general power 0f

The surviving Grantor

shall

appointment.

(R., p. 277).

Thus, by Virtue 0f Sybil’s exercise 0f her power of appointment, Michael became a

beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust, Which was originally composed 0f Sybil’s separate property

and her one-half of any community property. (See

R., p.

271 (Trust,

§ 5.02); R., p. 865).

As

such,

under the dispositive provisions 0f the power of appointment, Michael became entitled t0 a onefourth share 0f “all 0fthe principal and undistributed net

at Sybil’s death, as

income remaining in the Survivor’s Trust”

well as a direct recipient 0f 6,250 units of Harquahala Farms,

limited liability company. (See R., p. 3 15 (Will, § 8.01)).
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LLC, an Idaho

As

became

the surviving grantor, Sybil

the sole trustee of the Trust

upon Roger’s

death.

(See R., p. 265 (Trust, § 3.03(a))). Under the terms of the Trust, Sybil had the ﬁduciary duty t0
carry out the allocation 0f

sub-trusts established

all

Roger’s and Sybil’s separate and community property between the

by the Trust and to

impartially administer the various provisions 0fthe Trust.

(See R., pp. 271 and 307 (Trust, §§ 5.02 and 20.05(p))). Speciﬁcally, and most signiﬁcantly, Sybil

had a ﬁduciary duty

to allocate all

of her separate property and her one-half share of community

property t0 the Survivor’s Trust and

all

0f Roger’s separate and community property to the various

Marital Trusts. (R., p. 271 (Trust, § 5.02)). Section 20.05(p) of the Trust also provided that, “In
the context ofthe Trustee, the

p. 307).

(11

9)).

Most,

if

not

all,

word

‘shall’ is

used

t0

impose a ﬁduciary duty 0n the Trustee.”

of the Trust corpus was comprised 0f community property.

Michael was not a beneﬁciary 0f any 0f the Marital Trusts

(i.e.,

(R., p.

(R.,

240

Roger’s separate property

and share of the community property), whereas the Sibling Trustees and

their children

were

beneﬁciaries 0f the Marital Trusts as well as the Survivor’s Trust. (See R., pp. 278-90). This dual
role created an inherent conﬂict

that casts a

shadow over

of interest on the part 0f the Sibling Trustees—indeed a concern

the entirety 0f this action.3

Sybil bore the administrative and ﬁduciary duties 0f the Initial Trustee until she died

May

25, 2015, in Arizona.

Wade and Xarissa) assumed

3

(R., p.

237

(1]

2)).

After Sybil died, the Sibling Trustees

control 0f all of the Trust assets,

(126.,

which were comprised of the

0n

Lois,

assets

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79, for a discussion of the duty of impartiality imposed upon trustees under
the

common law.
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in the Marital Trusts (in

Michael

is

which Michael claims no

one of the beneﬁciaries.

(R., p.

265

interest)

and

in the Survivor’s Trust,

(Trust, § 3.03(a))).

Because Michael was never a beneﬁciary of any 0f the Marital Trusts,
Michael review Trust administrative and ﬁnancial records
assets to the Survivor’s Trust

was done properly and

in order t0

that the valuation

it

conﬁrm
0f his

was

Michael t0 determine

if

interest therein

was n0 way

had been administered properly 0r that accurate and

complete records 0f the Trust administration had been kept.
13)).

was

an allocation had in fact been made, whether the allocation was done

properly, that his share 0f the Survivor’s Trust

(1]

critical that

the allocation 0f

correctly stated. Without access t0 Trust ﬁnancial and administrative records, there

for

0f which

(R., p.

241-242; see also R.,

p.

211

Notwithstanding Michael’s right t0 review “relevant” Trust records, the Successor

Trustees adamantly refused to allow
administration before Sybil’s death.

“standing” t0

demand

this position

the trustee “shall

to Trust records pertaining t0 the period

of

Speciﬁcally, they argued, incorrectly, that he had no

access t0 such administrative and ﬁnancial records because he

beneﬁciary before Sybil’s death.
maintained

him access

(Id.;

see also R., pp. 865-866).

was not a

The Trustees obdurately

notwithstanding §§ 18.10 and 20.05(p) 0f the Trust Which required that

make

the ﬁnancial records and documentation 0f the Trust available t0

beneﬁciaries at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice for inspection by the beneﬁciaries.”
(R., pp. 294,

307

(italics

added». The Successor Trustees’ refusal

relating t0 the time prior to Sybil’s death

which requires

trustees t0

keep

was

also

trust beneﬁciaries

t0

allow access t0 Trust records

made notwithstanding Idaho Code

§ 15-7-303,

reasonably informed as t0 the administration 0f
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the Trust and despite

its

provisions granting beneﬁciaries access t0 “relevant information” about

the assets of the Trust and the particulars relating t0 administration.

Ten months

after this action

was

ﬁled, the Successor Trustees ﬁnally provided an “Interim

Accounting and Inventory” that did not cover any transactions occurring in the period prior
Sybil’s death. (R., p. 247).

4

t0

Again, they refused to allow Michael access t0 the underlying Trust

records kept before Sybil’s death, thereby preventing Michael from determining the proper amount

0f his share 0f the accrued net income and principal in the Survivor’s Trust as 0f the date 0f his
mother’s death. (R.,

In fact, Michael vigorously disputed whether such initial inventory

p. 247).

was properly prepared and

if

it

contained enough detail from Which the beneﬁciaries, including

Michael, could determine ifthe inventory was accurate. (See R.,
suspicions about the accuracy 0f the

there

initial

p.

214

(1]

17)).

Michael had many

inventory, but Without access t0 Trust ﬁnancial records

was no way t0 determine or conﬁrm what his rightful share 0f the Survivor’s Trust was. (See

R., pp. 244-252).

After more than ten months of futile demands in this action for complete and
Trust ﬁnancial and administrative records, Michael

full

access to

was faced with a thorny dilemma created by

the Successor Trustees’ wrongful actions. Speciﬁcally, the Trust contained a provision providing

that if

any beneﬁciary “ﬁles

suit

estate

0f either Grantor

then the beneﬁciary’s interest under the Trust Agreement shall be

determined as

4

it

.

.

.

0n a

creditor’s claim ﬁled

would have been determined

as if the

by

the beneﬁciary in a probate 0f the

beneﬁciary predeceased the

last

Grantor to

This action was ﬁled on July 27, 2016. (R., p. 10). The Successor Trustee’s Interim Accounting and Inventory
were delivered to Michael’s attorney 0n April 6, 2017. (R., p. 246).

APPELLANT’S BRIEF PAGE

7

die without leaving

any surviving descendants.”

(R., p.

suspicions and concerns about the accuracy of the

a proper allocation had been

made between the

initial

303 (Trust,

§ 20.03)).

Michael had

many

inventory and speciﬁcally Whether or not

Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts. However,

without access to the underlying Trust records (including those related t0 Sybil’s time as trustee),

he had n0

way of determining

properly administered

if

Sybil had

made

a proper allocation t0 the Survivor’s Trust 0r had

it.

Following Sybil’s death, the Sibling Trustees ﬁled a petition for probate of her Will in the

Arizona probate court and pursuant thereto Sybil’s Will was admitted t0 probate 0n August 31,
2015. (R.,

p. 466).

The probate was ﬁled by the Sibling Trustees

Representatives 0f Sybil’s estate. (R., p. 466).

conducted, rather

it

No

in their capacity as Co—Personal

administration of the probate of the Estate

was

appears the probate was ﬁled for the purpose 0f conveying Sybil’s interest in

a large, expensive residence in Idaho directly to Xarissa, rather than conveying such interest t0 the
Survivor’s Trust, as required under § 2.01 0f Sybil’s Will.

Code §§

14-3 803 and 14-3804 provided that

all

(R., pp.

242-45

(W

14-17)).

Arizona

claims against a decedent’s estate Will be barred

unless presented within two years after the decedent’ s death and unless the claimant ﬁles a Petition

for

Allowance

in the

Court not

later

than sixty days after the mailing of a Notice 0f Disallowance

by the Personal Representatives. Recognizing that access
Sybil’s death

was

critical for

t0 properly allocate

stay the proceedings

to Trust records for the period preceding

determining whether or not Sybil had breached her ﬁduciary duties

and administer the Trust corpus, Michael asked the Arizona probate court

on the Arizona Petition pending a resolution 0f the Idaho

action.

(R., p.

t0

598

(w 5-8)). Accordingly, the parties entered into a stipulation for a stay 0fthe action and the Arizona
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probate court signed an Order t0 that effect 0n July 10, 2017. (R., p. 602). The Arizona Petition

and the Stay were ﬁled

in order t0 prevent the running

0f claims against Sybil’s

estate. (R., p.

598

(11

5)).

of the Arizona limitation period for ﬁling

The Successor Trustees did not dispute

the

purpose for ﬁling such creditor’s claim and Petition.
After Michael ﬁled the Arizona Petition, the Successor Trustees ﬁled a supplemental

pleading asserting that Michael had forfeited his share 0f the Survivor’s Trust under the Trust’s
Forfeiture Clause and further asking for a declaratory

Forfeiture Clause under these circumstances.

judgment

(R., p. 425).

At

as t0 the enforceability of the

summary judgment hearing

the

before Magistrate Judge Hunn, Michael argued that application of the Forfeiture Clause under the

Circumstances here would interfere with proper administration of the Trust.

(R., pp.

Michael further argued that the Successor Trustees should be estopped from seeking
Forfeiture Clause until they provided Michael with access t0 the records

determine
Trust.

if

Sybil had

(R., p. 620).

made

608-1

1).

t0 enforce the

from which he could

a proper allocation between the Marital Trusts and the Survivor’s

Michael further argued that the Successor Trustees should be equitably

estopped from enforcing the Forfeiture Clause based upon the fact that they had precipitated the

need

to ﬁle the

Arizona Petition

in order to toll the limitation period.

(R., p. 620).

argued that the Successor Trustees could not “have their cake and eat

it

Michael also

t00”—that

is,

wrongly

refuse access to Trust records and then assert that Michael did not have reasonable cause t0 ﬁle

the Arizona Petition against Sybil’s estate.

(R., p. 621).

Michael also ﬁled a Motion

the Successor Trustees to respond t0 discovery in order t0 enable

Trustees’ claim that the Arizona Petition

was ﬁled without probable
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him

t0

t0

Compel

defend against the

cause. (R., pp. 432-34).

III.

Course 0f Proceedings Below.

On

July 27, 2016, Michael

commenced

this action

by ﬁling a

Petition in the Magistrate’s

Division of the District Court in and for Madison County, Idaho. (R., p. 10). Following the ﬁling

of Motions for Summary Judgment by
issued a

Memorandum

Decision, Judge

Hunn

all

0f the

parties, the

Decision on December 21, 2017.

Honorable Eric

(R., pp. 676-99).

S.

Hunn, Magistrate,

In his

Memorandum

held that Michael was not entitled to inspect and copy ﬁnancial and

administrative records 0f the Survivor’s Trust kept 0r created prior t0 Sybil’s death because

Michael

“is not,

and never has been, a beneﬁciary 0fth0se trusts

However, Judge Hunn also declined

[the Marital Trusts] .” (R., p. 689).

to enforce the Forfeiture Clause, reasoning that Michael’s

Arizona Petition did not trigger the Trust’s Forfeiture Clause because
preserve the status quo “While attempting t0 ascertain the

(R., p. 687).

The Magistrate

full

it

was merely an

effort t0

extent 0f his interest [in the Trust]”.

also held that the Forfeiture Clause “cannot prevent Petitioner

from

attempting t0 inquire about the intent 0f the Grantor [regarding] the extent 0f the beneﬁciary’s
interest.” (R., p. 687).

Both

parties ﬁled appeals in the District Court of

Judge Gregory

W. Moeller

presiding.

On December

Madison County, Honorable

29, 2018, Judge Moeller issued a Decision

0n Appeal wherein he reversed the Magistrate’s decision ruling
beneﬁciary 0fthe Survivor’s Trust until Sybil’s death.

(R., p. 865).

However, the

District

3,

that

Michael did not become a

(R., p. 865). Speciﬁcally, the District

held that Michael became a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust

appointment in her Will, signed on October

District

when

Sybil exercised the

Court

power 0f

2013—appr0ximately 19 months before her

death.

Judge also reversed Judge Hunn’s determination that the
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Forfeiture Clause

its

was not enforceable under the circumstances.

(R., pp. 869-74).

Notwithstanding

determination that Michael became a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust prior t0 Sybil’s death,

the District Court concluded that because Sybil

had the right t0 invade the trust corpus

for her

own

beneﬁt, neither the Trust nor Sybil’s Will imposed any ﬁduciary duty t0 protect or preserve the

corpus 0f the Trust for Michael’s beneﬁt.

(R., pp. 869-74).

Based on

that inference, the Court

held that Michael’s Arizona Petition was ﬁled Without probable cause, therefore rendering the
Forfeiture Clause fully enforceable. (R., pp. 869-74).

From such dubious

inference and the resultant forfeiture 0f Michael’s entire interest in the

Survivor’s Trust, Michael brings this appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

As

a beneﬁciary, did Michael have the right to inspect Trust records under § 18.10 0f the

Trust and Idaho

B.

ON APPEAL

Did

Code

§ 15-7-303(b) t0

the District Court err in

ﬁnding

determine his rightful share 0fthe Survivor’s Trust?
that the Trust’s Forfeiture Clause

was enforceable

against Michael as a matter of law, notwithstanding the Successor Trustees’ breach 0f their

duty t0 allow Michael access to Trust ﬁnancial and administrative records?

C.

Did the

District Court err in failing to require the Successor Trustees t0 rectify their breach

0f ﬁduciary duties as Trustees

(126.,

their failure to allow

Michael access

to relevant Trust

records) as a condition precedent for their ability t0 assert that Michael did not have

probable cause t0 question 0r challenge the administration 0f the Survivor’s Trust?
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Did

the District Court err in inferring that Sybil, as the surviving settlor and sole trustee of

the Trust,

owed n0 ﬁduciary duty

t0

Michael as a residuary beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s

Trust because Sybil had Wide latitude to use Trust assets for her

Did the District Court err in holding that the Successor Trustees’
0f Trust records relating to the period prior

refusal t0 allow inspection

t0 Sybil’s death, did not

administration 0f the Trust and as such the Forfeiture Clause

Did the

own beneﬁt?

was

impede the proper

fully enforceable?

District Court err in holding that the Successor Trustees

were not equitably

estopped from enforcing the Forfeiture Clause, notwithstanding their refusal t0 provide
information that would have allowed Michael t0 determine if Sybil had breached her

ﬁduciary duties as the

Did

Initial

Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust?

the District Court err in failing t0 reverse the Magistrate’s refusal t0 allow Michael to

pursue discovery in order t0 enable him to defend against the Successor Trustees’ claim
that

Is

by ﬁling the Arizona Petition Michael had forfeited his

Michael

entitled to

interest in the Survivor's Trust?

an award 0f attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41?
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§ 12-

ARGUMENT
I.

The

District

Court Erred

Concluding that Michael’s Arizona Petition

in

Commenced Without Probable Cause Because

Sybil

Owed N0

Was

Him

Duties t0

as a

Residual Beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust.
A.

Michael Became a Beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust Over I9 Months Prior t0 Sybil ’s
Death and as Such Sybil Owed Him the Same Duties That Were Owed t0 the Other
Beneﬁciaries offhe Survivor’s Trust.
In the trial court below, Michael sought to obtain ﬁnancial information relating t0 the

administration of the Survivor’s Trust prior t0 Sybil’s death in order t0 enable
the value 0f his share 0f the Survivor’s Trust.

him

t0 determine

Section 5.02 0f the Trust required that upon the

death of the ﬁrst Grantor, the Trust assets were t0 be separated and allocated between the
Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts,

all

0f which had different dispositive provisions. (See R.,

pp. 271, 274-88 (Trust, § 5.02 and Articles

Michael’s Motion for

Summary Judgment 0n

the basis that Michael

that interest did not arise until the death

Upon

0f Sybil Ferguson.”

trial

court denied

had n0 “standing”

Trust records kept before Sybil’s death because “[Michael’ s] only interest

and

The

Seven through Fifteen».

is in

t0

review

the Survivor’s Trust

(R., p. 670).

appeal, the District Court reversed the Magistrate’s determination that Michael

lacked standing t0 review relevant trust documents concerning his share 0f the Survivor’s Trust.

(See R., p. 865).

The Idaho Uniform Probate Code deﬁnes

“Beneﬁciary,” as

it

the term “beneﬁciary” as follows:

relates t0 trust beneﬁciaries, includes a

person

who

has

any present or future interest, vested 0r contingent, and also includes the
owner 0f an interest by assignment 0r other transfer and as it relates t0 a
charitable trust, includes

Idaho Code

§ 15-1-201(3).

Sybil executed her Will

any person

Based upon

on October

3,

entitled to enforce the trust.

this provision, the District

Court concluded that when

2013, pursuant to a power of appointment granted to her
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under

§ 8.01

0f the Trust, Michael became a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust, along with the

other designated beneﬁciaries.

appointment, she

made n0

any other beneﬁciaries

named

(R., p.

distinction

(i.e.,

865).5

Notably,

between Michael’s

its

Sybil exercised her

rights as a

power 0f

beneﬁciary and the rights 0f

the Sibling Trustees and their children)

as beneﬁciaries 0f the Survivor’s Trust. (R., pp.

Despite

When

Who were

simultaneously

394-96 (Will, Article Eight)).

determination as t0 Michael’s status as a beneﬁciary upon Sybil’s exercise 0f

her power 0f appointment, the District Court concluded as a matter of law that Michael was not
entitled t0 inspect 0r

make

copies 0f relevant Trust records because he forfeited that right

the Arizona Petition in the probate 0f Sybil’s estate.

reached this conclusion by inferring that no duty was

(See R., pp. 867-72).

owed t0 Michael because

under the Trust instrument t0 invade the Trust corpus for her
Accordingly, the District Court reasoned that

it

own

was unreasonable

The

by ﬁling

District

Court

Sybil had discretion

purposes. (See R., p. 869).

for

Michael 0r his lawyers

t0

conclude that Michael was entitled t0 an “accounting” 0f the Trust ﬁnancial records before Sybil’s
death.

(R., p. 872).

The

District

Court chose not to address or explain

why Michael’s

request t0

the Successor Trustees for information concerning “relevant information about the assets 0f the

Trust and the particulars relating t0 the administration” did not include information about the
allocation between the Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts or information about the subsequent

administration 0f the Survivor’s Trust. See Idaho

5

The Successor Trustees have not appealed

Code

§ 15-7-303(b).

the District Court’s conclusion.
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The District Court’s Inference That Sybil

B.

Owed N0

One 0f

Duties t0 Michael as

the

Residual Beneﬁciaries offhe Survivor's Trust Would Render the Trust Illusory.

The

District Court

concluded that Sybil owed no ﬁduciary duty t0 Michael 0r any 0f the

other residual beneﬁciaries because § 8.02 of the Trust permitted Sybil t0 distribute t0 herself “as

much of the principle of the
for

any purpose.”6

Survivor’s Trust

(R., p. 867).

The

.

.

.

as [she]

may determine

District Court’s conclusion

0f the Trust, Which absolves successor trustees from any

books and records of a predecessor trustee.

was

is

necessary or advisable

also premised

liability or obligation t0

(R., p. 867). Speciﬁcally, the District

upon

§ 18.05

examine the

Court concluded:

While Michael’s interest as a beneﬁciary evolved from contingent to vested
upon his mother’s death, prior t0 her death, the trust imposed n0 duty 0n
Sybil t0 protect orpreserve the corpus 0fthe trustfor Michael.

(R., p.

868

(italics

added». The Court further reasoned

that:

T0 hold otherwise would stand centuries of probate law 0n its head,
bestowing upon children the legal right to dictate to their parents—who
serve as trustees of their
their standard

own trusts—how much they can spend to maintain

of living and

lifestyle in order to assure

themselves an

adequate inheritance. Such a result is neither compelled nor even suggested
by any known precedent 0r statute. Therefore, the Court concludes that

under the circumstances 0f this case, the Trustees’ only duties t0 Michael,
under the terms of the Shelter Trust [i.e., the Survivor's Trust] and the Will,

6

The

District Court also recognized its conclusion in this regard was equally applicable to the other beneﬁciaries
0fthe Survivor’s Trust: “The forfeiture provision does not interfere With the enforcement or proper administration

0fthe Shelter Trust because Sybil

owed no ﬁduciary duty

t0

any 0fthe beneﬁciaries.”
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(R., p.

874

(italics

added)).

are limited to the proper administration of the Shelter Trust after Sybil ’s

death as provided in LC.
(See R., p. 869

(italics

§ 15-7-303.

and brackets added». From

that illogical premise, the District

Court then

concluded that Michael ﬁled the Arizona Petition in Sybil’s estate without reasonable cause, Which
triggered the Trust’s Forfeiture Clause:

As noted

above, the record

is

clear that neither the Original Trust, the

imposed any ﬁduciary duty 0n Sybil towards
Absent a ﬁduciary duty, it would not be
reasonable for Michael 0r his lawyers to conclude that he would be entitled
t0 an accounting 0f the Trust’s ﬁnancial records [kept] before Sybil’s death.
Shelter Trust, nor the Will

Michael prior

(R., p. 872).

that Sybil

t0 her death.

In essence, the District

Count concluded

that

it

was impossible

for

Michael

to assert

breached any ﬁduciary duty because, according t0 the District Court, n0 duty was owed.

The problems with

the District Court’s reasoning and inferences are legion. First, Sybil’s

ﬁduciary duties as trustee to properly administer the Trust corpus do not in any
ability as a

beneﬁciary t0 invade the Trust corpus for her

own

purposes.

way impede

her

The Court’s inference

misinterprets and overstates the purpose of §§ 8.02, 18.01 and 18.50 0f the Trust, With the net
result that the Court’s decision puts these provisions into conﬂict with the other Trust provisions

which expressly imposed ﬁduciary

duties

upon

the Trustees.7

Second, the District Court failed t0 recognize the implications of its

initial

conclusion that

Michael became a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust when Sybil exercised her power 0f
appointment in his favor. That event occurred over 19 months before Sybil’s death. Once Michael

became a beneﬁciary, Sybil would have owed him

7

See R.,

p.

307

the

same

duties as

(Trust, § 20.05(p)).
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were owed

t0 the other

residual beneﬁciaries 0f the Survivor’s Trust.

damage

breached any 0f those duties and caused

to the residual beneﬁciaries’ interests, then all beneﬁciaries (including

have a potential claim against Sybil’s
See Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts

§

estate,

depending upon the circumstances 0f such breach.

assumed

that Michael’s claims against Sybil’s estate

Arizona were based solely upon acts or omissions by Sybil prior

beneﬁciary 0f the Trust.

t0 the date

Michael became a

Michael’s potential claims against Sybil were not so based.8

above, because the Successor Trustees refused t0 provide

concerning Trust administration, Michael does not
the residual beneﬁciaries.

Michael) would

205.

Third, the District Court erroneously

in

If Sybil

One 0f the

t0 determine if the Survivor’s Trust

him with

know when

As noted

“relevant” information

0r if Sybil breached her duties to

reasons Michael sought such information was t0 enable

had been properly administered and

his

him

Arizona Petition was

ﬁled for the express purpose 0f preserving a potential claim against Sybil’s estate in the event the
Trust records reﬂected improper administration.
relating t0 Sybil’s time as trustee,

he has no

Until Michael

is

given access to Trust records

way of knowing When or if Sybil breached any of her

duties t0 the beneﬁciaries of the Survivor’s Trust.

Fourth, the District Court conﬂated

Successor Trustees and
she

was

alive.

its

its

analysis of a Claim for a breach of duty by the

analysis of a claim against Sybil’s estate for breach

ofher duties While

The former analysis depends upon whether 0r not Michael’ s request for information

R. pp. 473 and 477. Michael’s potential claims against Sybil’s estate are not and Will not depend

claims that arose prior to the date he became a beneﬁciary.
estate

upon proof of

Rather, Michael’s potential claim against Sybil’s

would depend upon proof 0f Sybil’s breach 0f a duty owed to him in his capacity as a beneﬁciary 0f the
Under the District Court’s own ruling, Michael became a beneﬁciary over 19 months before

Survivor’s Trust.
Sybil’s death.
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was “relevant”

t0 his interest in the Trust

Whether or not Sybil was obligated

Code

§

and has nothing

t0 provide

t0

d0 with the date 0f Sybil’s death 0r

Michael with an accounting before she died. Idaho

15-7-303 provides in pertinent part as follows:

DUTY TO INFORM AND ACCOUNT TO BENEFICIARIES. The trustee
shall
its

keep the beneﬁciaries of the

trust

reasonably informed of the trust and

administration. In addition:

****
(b)

Upon reasonable

request, the trustee shall provide the beneﬁciary with

a copy 0f the terms of the trust Which describe 0r affect his interest and with
relevant information about the assets of the trust and the particulars relating
t0 the administration.

Idaho Code

§

15-7-303. Thus, the only questions relative t0 Michael’s request for Trust records

should have been (1) Whether or not Michael was a beneﬁciary and (2) whether his request was
“relevant” t0 a determination 0f his interest in the Survivor’s Trust. Conversely, whether Michael

had reasonable cause

owed him

to ﬁle a claim against Sybil’s estate

would depend upon whether 0r not Sybil

a duty at any time before she died and Whether she breached that duty.

That analysis

presents a wholly different question apart from the question 0f whether the Successor Trustees

breached their duties t0 provide Michael with an accurate accounting and t0 allow him access t0
“relevant” Trust administrative records.
Finally, the District Court’s inferences concerning the non-existence

Sybil are not supported

by any provision of the Will

of any duty owed by

0r the Trust, and if applied in the

manner

adopted by the District Court, the Trust would be illusory and self—contradictory 0f other provisions
expressly imposing duties upon the Trustee. (See R., p. 307 (Trust, § 20.05(p))).

conclude that a Trust exists Where no ﬁduciary duties are

owed t0
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It is

illogical to

the Trust beneﬁciaries.

Provisions that purport t0 unconditionally exonerate trustees from liability for breach 0f

their

ﬁduciary duties are invalid on the ground that

effect to them.

See Restatement (Second) Trusts

§

would be contrary

it

222 cmt

t0 public policy t0 give

see also R. Whitman, Exoneration

b;

Clauses in Wills and Trust Instruments, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 123 (1992); Donovan

Mark R.
is

Gillen and Lionel D. Smith, Waters Law ofTrusts in

a trustee a

ﬁduciary—a person whose

for improper administration,

and

if the

is

is

altogether denied that recourse,

questionable Whether or not a settlor has created a trust at

Law ofTrusts and Trustees
cmt on

§

673 (Rev. 2d

be taken away even by the

a beneﬁciary’s right ofrecourse against the trustee

beneﬁciary

a trust without any accountability in the trustee

Waters,

Canada 927 (3d ed. 2005). Not only

essential character cannot

creator of the trust—but the essence 0f a trust

W.M.

is

all.

Id.

it is

highly

A settlor “who attempts t0 create

contradicting himself.” Bogert and Bogart, The

ed. 1993); see also

Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts § 96

(2).

1]

If,

as the District Court held, Sybil

owed n0

duties to Michael 0r

any of the residual

beneﬁciaries of the Survivor’s Trust prior to her death, then there would have been no trust at

The District Court’s conclusions defy logic and,
C.

if accepted,

all.

would render the Trust totally illusory.

The District Court ’S Inference That Michael Had N0 Rights as a Beneﬁciary Because Sybil
Had the Ability t0 Invade the Trust Corpus Under § 8.02 0fthe Trust Ignores the Inherent
Nature ofA Trustee’s Fiduciary Responsibilities and also Ignores the Provisions in the
Trust Expressly Imposing Fiduciary Duties Upon the Trustee.
1

.

Common Law

Trustee Duties
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In general, a trustee has a duty under the

in

good

faith in

accordance With

its

common law t0

administer the trust diligently and

The Restatement

terms and applicable law.

outlines such

duties as follows:

Duty

t0

Administer the Trust in Accordance with

its

Terms and

Applicable Law.
(1)

The

and in good
and applicable law.

trustee has a duty t0 administer the trust, diligently

faith, in

accordance with the terms 0f the

administering

(2) In

the

trust,

trust

trustee’s

the

responsibilities

include

performance of the following functions:

and powers 0f the trusteeship, and the
beneﬁciaries and purposes 0f the trust;

(a) ascertaining the duties

(b) collecting
(c)

and protecting

trust properties;

managing the trust estate
from trust property; and

to provide returns 0r other

beneﬁts

income in principle during the
and upon its termination.

(d) applying or distributing trust

administration 0f the trust

See Restatement (Third) of Trusts

§ 76.

Such

duties include a duty t0 administer the trust as a

prudent person would, in light 0f the purposes, terms and other circumstances 0f the

Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts
interest

§ 77.

The

trustee also has a duty to administer the trust solely in the

ofthe beneﬁciaries, 0r solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose. The trustee

t0 a strict prohibition against

(Third) 0f Trusts § 78.

engaging in transactions that involve self—dealing.

A trustee’s

Each

is

subject

Restatement

duty also includes a duty t0 administer the trust in a manner

that is impartial With respect t0 the various beneﬁciaries

§ 79.

trust.

of the

trust.

Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts

trustee also has a duty t0 use reasonable care t0 prevent a co-trustee

a breach 0f trust and, if a breach occurs, to obtain redress.

from committing

Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts

§ 81.

Importantly, a trustee also has a duty t0 promptly respond t0 any request 0f a beneﬁciary for
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information concerning the trust
to inspect trust

The

its

information, and t0 permit beneﬁciaries on a reasonable basis

documents, records and property holdings. Restatement (Third) of Trusts

trustee also has a duty to maintain clear,

property and the administration of the

As can be seen from
trust for the best interest

trust.

complete and accurate records regarding the

Restatement (Third) of Trusts

the foregoing citations, a trustee has

trust

§ 83.

duties t0 administer the

of the beneﬁciaries. Such duties are inherent in the fundamental nature

of a trust and d0 not in any way conﬂict with a grantor’s use 0f the
express provisions 0f the

many

§ 82.

The

trust.

trust

corpus consistent with the

District Court’s inference here that

n0 duties were owed

t0

Michael and the other residual beneﬁciaries cannot be squared with the many-faceted duties

imposed upon a

trustee t0 properly administer the trust.

The

District

Court simply drew an overly

expansive inference concerning provisions in §§ 8.02, 18.01 and 18.05 of the Trust that was never
intended by the Grantors here.

If accepted,

inherent duties as a ﬁduciary. (See R., p. 867).

own purposes
as there

were

according to

2.

The

such inference would entirely negate a trustee’s
Sybil’s discretion t0 use the Trust corpus for her

does not limit 0r abrogate her inherent duties—as a trustee—in any way.
assets in the Trust’s sub-trusts, Sybil

its

had a ﬁduciary duty

As long

t0 administer the Trust

express terms and in accordance With applicable law.

Express Duties under the Terms offhe Trust and the Idaho Probate Code.
District Court’s conclusion that

any of the beneﬁciaries, prior

n0 duties were owed

t0 Sybil’s death is also belied

by

Section 20.05, entitled “Deﬁnitions,” provides as follows:
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t0 Michael, 0r for that matter to

the express terms 0f the Trust.

For purposes 0f this Trust Agreement, the following terms
following meanings:

shall

have the

****
(p)

Shall

and

May
this Trust Agreement or by the
word “shall” is used in this Trust Agreement
command, direct, 0r require, and the word “may” is

Unless otherwise speciﬁcally provided in
context in Which used, the
t0

impose a duty,

used to allow 0r permit, but not to require. In the context 0fthe Trustee,
”
the word “shall is used t0 impose aﬁduciarjy duly 0n the Trustee
.

(See R., p. 307 (Trust, § 20.05(p),

italics

added)).

the Trust, and each use imposes a ﬁduciary duty

that

power of appointment, Michael

clearly

that

upon

“shall”

is

.

used repeatedly throughout

the trustees, including the initial trustee.

Michael became a beneﬁciary upon Sybil’s exercise 0f her

Based upon the Court’s ruling

The Court’s conclusion

The word

.

became

a beneﬁciary before Sybil died. (R., pp. 865—66).

Michael had n0 reasonable cause

t0

commence

the “placeholder”

Arizona Petition because Sybil owed him n0 duties prior t0 her death, does not square With the
Court’s

own ﬁnding
It

that

Michael became a beneﬁciary well before Sybil’s death.9

should be noted that under

not exercise any

power

in a

manner

§ 19.01

of the Trust, the

initial

and successor trustees could

that is inconsistent with the rights

of the beneﬁciaries to the

beneﬁcial enj oyment 0f the Trust property in accordance with the general principles 0f the law of
trusts.

(R., p. 296).

Further, every trustee has a duty to administer the Trust “in a

impartial with respect to the

It

all

manner

that is

beneficiaries.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 183. This duty 0f

should be noted here that the District Court also confuses the probable cause requirement With the standard for

entitlement to inspect Trust records.

The

latter

standard

was based upon relevant

information. See Idaho

Code

§ 15-7-303(b). Hence even if Michael did not become a beneﬁciary until Sybil’s death, information concerning
Sybil’s administration of the Trust, including the allocation as between the Marital Trust and Survivor's Trust

would

still

be relevant information.
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impartiality

is

particularly important here because Michael

was not

a beneﬁciary of any 0f the

Marital Trusts, whereas the Sibling Trustees were beneﬁciaries of both the Survivor’s Trust and
the Marital Trusts.

Importantly, Sybil (as trustee) had the ﬁduciary duty and obligation to

separately allocate and administer the Trust funds allocated t0 the Survivor’s Trust and in doing

so to act With impartiality as between the various sub-trusts involved. If

intended to be illusory,

why would

all

of those duties were

Sybil and Roger bother to draft a forty-nine-page Trust

Agreement, expressly imposing such duties?
It

was an

incredible stretch 0f the imagination for the District Court t0 infer that all 0f the

inherent and express duties imposed

upon

the Trustee

were abrogated by

Virtue 0f Sybil’s right t0

invade the Trust corpus and by provisions designed t0 protect successor trustees from personal
liability for the acts

of their predecessors. As long as there were funds in the Survivor’s Trust,

Sybil had a continuing duty t0 properly allocate and

all

manage

the trust With impartiality as

between

of the various beneﬁciaries and she had no ability to modify or abrogate these duties once the

Trust

became

irrevocable.

0f the Survivor’s Trust

(R., p.

entitles

271 (Trust,

§ 5.01)).

him t0 enforce the

duties

Michael’s status as a residual beneﬁciary

owed to him, the same as the other residual

beneﬁciaries 0f the Survivor’s Trust, including the right to enforce the provisions in § 5.02
regarding proper allocation. (R., p. 271). The District Court erroneously misconstrued Michael’s

Arizona Petition as being “based 0n actions taken before he had any
872).
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interest in the Estate.” (R., p.

D.

The District Court Misinterpreted §§ 18.01 and 18.05 0f the Trust as Support for
Conclusion That Sybil

As

Owed N0 Duties

additional support for

is

t0

its

Michael.

conclusion that Sybil

owed n0

duties t0 the residual

beneﬁciaries of the Survivor's Trust, the District Court also cited to §§ 18.01 and 18.05 of the
Trust.

(R., p. 867).

The

District

Court once again inferred

far too

much from

the provisions of

these Trust provisions. These sections provide as follows:

Section 18.01 Distributions t0 Beneﬁciaries.

Whenever this Trust Agreement
distribution 0f net

authorizes 0r directs the Trustee t0

income 0r principal

make

t0 a beneﬁciary, the Trustee

a

may

apply for the beneﬁt 0f the beneﬁciary any property that otherwise could be
distributed directly t0 the beneﬁciary. The Trustee is not required t0 inquire
into the beneﬁciary' s ultimate disposition

of the distributed property unless

otherwise speciﬁcally directed by this Trust Agreement. The Trustee may
make distributions in cash 0r in kind, 0r partly in each, in proportions and
values determined by the Trustee. The Trustee may allocate undivided
interests in speciﬁc assets to a beneﬁciary or trust created hereunder in any
at

proportion 0r manner that the Trustee determines, even though the property

may be different from that allocated t0 another
may make such determinations without regard to

allocated to one beneﬁciary

beneﬁciary. The Trustee
the

income tax

attributes

of the property and without the consent of any

beneﬁciary.

****
Section 18.05 Exoneration 0f Trustees.

No successor trustee is obligated t0 examine the accounts, records or actions
0f any previous trustee, the personal representative 0f the estate 0f a
deceased Grantor or any previous ﬁduciary. No successor trustee shall be
omission or forbearance by any previous
trustee 0r by the personal representative of the estate of a deceased Grantor
0r any other previous ﬁduciary.
held responsible for any

act,

.

.

(R., pp. 290-91).

Section 18.01 merely accords discretion t0 the Trustee to

beneﬁciaries With respect to the

manner

in

Which Trust

make

distributions are
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distributions t0 the

made. Nothing in that

section

would abrogate

the Trustee’s obligation

with respect t0 the competing interests 0f
interpretation of § 18.01

impartially and in

The

good

District

faith

with respect t0

Court also cited to

hold that

stretch

§

all

all

The

and

t0 act impartially

District Court’s expansive

the other duties of the Trustee t0 act

beneﬁciaries.

18.05 in support 0f

its

conclusion that Sybil

any of the other residual beneﬁciaries. (See

duties expressly

owed no

R., p. 867). Again,

imposed upon the Trustee, also requires a great

of imagination. This section was obviously designed t0 insulate successor trustees from
liability associated

With any breach 0f ﬁduciary duty committed by a predecessor

The prohibition against

derivative personal liability With respect to a successor trustee

any personal
trustee.

18.05 negates

§

all

distributions

beneﬁciaries.

would paradoxically negate

duties t0 Michael or apparently to

t0

all

make proper

does not in any

way

absolve the prior trustee, in this case Sybil, from her duty t0 properly

administer the Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts.

Further, t0 infer that § 18.05 totally

abrogated the trustee’s ﬁduciary duty t0 properly allocate and administer Trust funds and would
negate the grantor’s express imposition 0f Trustee ﬁduciary duties under § 20.05(p) 0f the Trust.”
Rather,

when properly interpreted,

0n account of the
were

10

to

acts

this provision

simply insulated successor trustees from

0f their predecessor and gave them broad discretion in

how

liability

distributions

be made.

Michael recognizes he was not a beneﬁciary at the time Roger died and that his ability to assert a claim against
Sybil for an improper allocation before he became a beneﬁciary would necessarily depend upon proof that Sybil
had a continuing duty t0 make a proper allocation or to correct prior misallocations. That question does not arise
here because under the District Court’s ruling, Michael became a beneﬁciary before Sybil died.
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II.

The Trust’s Forfeiture Provision Should Not Be Enforced under the Circumstances
Here Because Doing So Would Impair Proper Administration 0f the Survivor’s Trust.

A.

Provisions Which Unconditionally Relieve Trustees 0f Their Duty t0 Properly Administer
a Trust and Perform Their Fiduciary Duties Are Void as Against Public Policy.

It is

common

for wills or trusts to include so-called “no-contest” 0r “exculpatory” clauses

that are intended t0 inhibit 0r prohibit frivolous attempts

by beneﬁciaries

t0 invalidate certain

provisions of a will 0r trust and to deter frivolous actions against estate or trust administrators.
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Donative Transfers) § 8.5 cmt. (b).

Such

clauses seek t0 deter unwarranted challenges t0 the donor’s intent and t0 prevent costly litigation

that

would deplete the

estate. Id.

0f a provision in a will 0r

trust,

“No-contest” clauses generally relate t0 challenges t0 the validity

while “exculpatory” clauses are intended t0 insulate 0r exonerate

a trustee from liability associated with another’s breach 0f ﬁduciary duty.

As

a general rule, a trustee

the trust to the extent 0f the

§ 205.

who commits

a breach of trust

is

Id.

liable t0 the beneﬁciaries

0f

damages suffered by the beneﬁciary. Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts

Grantors 0f a trust have no authority to include provisions within a trust instrument that

purport t0 relieve trustees 0f their duties t0 properly administer a trust or otherwise perform their
duties for the beneﬁt 0f beneﬁciaries

public policy. This principle of law

(1)

is

and

t0 the extent

such clauses do

so,

they are void as against

stated in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts:

A provision in the terms 0f a trust that relieves a trustee 0f liability for

breach 0f trust, and that was not included in the instrument as a result of the
trustee’s abuse

0f a ﬁduciary 0r conﬁdential relationship,

except to the extent that

it

(a) ofliabilityfor

enforceable

purports t0 relieve the trustee:

a breach 0ftrust

t0 theﬁduciarjy duties
trust,

is

in

badfaith 0r with indifference

0fthe trustee, the terms 0r thepurposes 0fthe

0r the interest 0fthe beneﬁciaries, or
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(b)

0f accountability for proﬁts derived from a breach 0f trust.

A

n0 contest clause Shall not be enforced t0 the extent that doing so
would interfere with the enforcement 0r proper administration 0fthe trust.
(2)

Restatement (Third) of Trusts

§

The exculpatory clause

96

added).

(italics

at issue

here goes far beyond merely insulating the trustees from

personal liability for certain actions, rather

beneﬁciary ﬁles
claim.

it

it

invokes waiver 0f a beneﬁciary’s interest

suit against the estate, regardless

Given such breadth,

it

if the

0f the existence 0f probable cause t0 ﬁle the

may be entirely unenforceable as a matter ofpublic policy or at least

should be narrowly construed t0 be applicable only to claims brought Without probable cause.

Provisions that purport t0 exonerate trustees from liability for breach 0f their ﬁduciary duties are
invalid

on the ground

that

it

Restatement (Second) Trusts

would be contrary

§

222 cmt

b;

t0 public policy to give effect to them.

see also R. Whitman, Exoneration Clauses in Wills and

Trust Instruments, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 123 (1992);

Lionel D. Smith, Waters

Law 0f Trusts

ﬁduciary—a person Whose

improper administration.
the trustee

is

in

Donovan W.M. Waters, Mark R.

Canada 927 (3d

essential Character cannot

trust—the fundamental essence 0f a trust

A settlor “who

contradicting himself.”

is

ed. 2005).

it is

Not only

is

Gillen and

a trustee a

be taken away, even by the creator 0f the

a beneﬁciary’s right 0f recourse against the trustee for

attempts t0 create a trust without any accountability in

Bogert and Bogart, The

Law 0f Trusts and

(Rev. 2d ed. 1993); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 96 cmt on
altogether denied that recourse,

See

1]

(2).

Trustees § 673

If the

beneﬁciary

is

highly questionable whether 0r not a settlor has created a trust

at all. Id.
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Idaho law provides that the intentions of the grantor should control in determining the
application and interpretation 0f provisions in trusts. Salfeety

Seideman

v.

(In re

Estate ofKirk),

127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794, 804 (1995); accord Carl H. Christensen Family Trust
Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 97 (1999).

intent,

it

Id.

When

question 0f law. Allen

P.

2d

When a court attempts t0 determine the grantor’s

construes a trust instrument as a Whole, considering

instrument.

36, 39 (Ct.

a

v.

document
Dennie

is

(In

clear

v.

all

parts in light 0f the entire

and unambiguous, interpretation of

its

meaning

is

a

Re: Inter Vivos Trusts by Turner), 116 Idaho 913, 916, 782

App. 1989).

Most jurisdictions have found “no-contest”

clauses (also

known

as “in terrorem” clauses)

valid and generally enforceable, provided they are narrowly drafted and reasonably construed.

Restatement (Third) 0f Trusts
beneﬁciaries

who

§

96 cmt.

e.

Such clauses are generally enforceable against

challenge the validity 0f the instrument, unless the beneﬁciary has probable

cause t0 bring the proceeding. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Donative Transfers)
§ 8.5.“

that

Probable cause exists “when,

at the

would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised,

substantial likelihood that the challenge

existence ofprobable cause

is

would be

successful.” Id.

t0

conclude that there was a

A factor that may indicate the

“whether the beneﬁciary relied upon the advice 0f independent legal

counsel sought in good faith after a

11

time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence

full

disclosure 0f the facts.” Id. No-contest clauses are often

For a similar statutory provision under the Idaho Uniform Probate Code, see Idaho Code
statutory provision appears to be limited to wills, the principle applies with equal force
under the common law discussed in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
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§

15-3-905. While this

to trusts, as recognized

used t0 deter

litigation

from

to prevent beneﬁciaries

parties seeking t0 question the validity of the donative instrument 0r

from bringing frivolous actions

settlement. Restatement (Third) of Trusts §

provision

is

one that seeks

96 cmt.

e.

in order t0 coerce a

more favorable

An example of an unenforceable no contest

punish “a demand for 0r challenge t0 a trustee’s

t0 prevent 0r

accounting.” Id. The ﬁling of a pleading “solely t0 procure time to ascertain the facts upon which
the decision t0 institute a proceeding

d.;

B.

see also Doelle

v.

rest” is not construed as

an action

t0 contest 0r t0

Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Donative Transfers)

challenge the instrument.

cmt.

must

§ 8.5

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

The District Court Erred

in

Failing 0r Refusing t0 First Address the Consequences offhe

’

Successor Trustees Breach ofTheir Duties

t0 Allow Michael as a Trust Beneﬁciary Access
Relevant Information Before Considering the Question 0f Whether Michael had
Reasonable Cause t0 File the Arizona Creditor’s Claim.

t0

Count IV 0f Michael’s Second Amended

In

Petition for

Accounting and Performance of

Trustee Duties, Michael sought an order from Magistrate Court requiring the Successor Trustees
to provide

to enable

him access

him

Sybil’s death.

to relevant information concerning the administration

to ascertain the value

of his

interest as a

Which allocation was pivotal

The Trust provides

beneﬁciary of the Survivor's Trust as of

Speciﬁcally, Michael sought access to Trust records concerning the

(R., p. 60).

allocation required under § 5.02 0f the Trust

death.

of the Trust, in order

to the nature

between the Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts,

and value 0f assets 0f the Survivor’s Trust

at Sybil’s

as follows:

Section 5.02

Allocation t0 Survivor's Trust

After the death 0f the ﬁrst Grantor t0 die, the surviving Grantor's interest in

any community property of the Trust and the surviving Grantor's separate
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Trust property shall be allocated to a separate trust (the “Survivor's Trust”)

and

shall

be administered as provided in Article Eight. For purposes of this

Trust Agreement, the deceased Grantor's interest in any

community

property 0f the Trust and the deceased Grantor’s separate property shall be
collectively referred t0 as the
is later

(R., p. 271).

The

among the

allocated

“Deceased Grantor’s Trust Property” [Which

Marital Trusts].

allocation 0f the multi-million-dollar Ferguson estate

Trust and the Marital Trusts

between the Survivor’s

was extremely important because Michael was not a beneﬁciary

0f the Marital Trusts, while the Sibling Trustees were beneficiaries ofboth the Survivor’s Trust

and the Marital Trusts. (See
Article Eight)).

R., pp. 274-276;

Most ofthe assets

315-317

in the Trust consisted

(Trust, Articles

ofRoger and

Seven and Eight; Will,

Sybil’s

community property.

238-240). Pursuant to § 5.02 0f the Trust, Sybil’s share 0f the community property and

(R., pp.

her separate property was t0 be allocated t0 the Survivor's Trust and Roger’s share 0f the

community property and
p. 271).

trustee

Additionally,

all

all

0f his separate property was t0 be allocated t0 the Marital Trusts.

0f Sybil’s probate estate was t0 be “poured over” t0 the “then-acting

0f the Survivor’s Trust.”

(R., p. 3 10 (Will, § 2.01)).

In the proceedings before the Magistrate Court, there

Successor Trustees’

(R.,

refusal

t0

was n0

factual dispute regarding the

allow Michael access t0 Trust records relating t0 Trust

administration prior t0 the date 0f Sybil’s death 0n

May 25,

2015.12

Speciﬁcally, the Successor

Trustees argued that Michael had n0 “standing” t0 request such administrative records because he

12

See R., pp. 133, 135-38 (1] 10 0f the Successor Trustees’ response and their Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eight,
and Ninth Afﬁrmatives); see also R., p. 440 (1] 7 0f the Successor Trustees’ Responses and Objections to
Plaintiff’s Interrogatories); R., pp. 245-47 (1W 19-22); R., pp. 342-45 (the Successor Trustees’ Interim
Accounting); Tr.

p. 46,

11.

4-10.
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did not

Judge

become

Hunn

a beneﬁciary of the Survivor’s Trust until Sybil’s death. (See R., p. 133

agreed With the Successor Trustees

Michael’s Motion for

§

Summary Judgment

10)).

(11

3“ standing” argument
and accordingly denied

seeking access to Trust records pursuant to Idaho Code

15-7-303 and § 18.10 0fthe Trust. (R., pp. 690-94).

As noted above,

the District Court reversed the Magistrate’s Decision concerning

Michael’s alleged lack of standing and

its

conclusion that Michael did not become a beneﬁciary

of the Survivor’s Trust until Sybil’s death. The Successor Trustees have not appealed the District
Court’s decision in that regard. Sybil executed her Will 0n 0r about October 3, 2013, which

approximately 19 months before she died 0n

May 25, 2015.

(R., p. 3

1 8).

Clearly, Michael

was

became

a beneﬁciary 0f the Trust before Sybil died.

Despite

its

reversal 0f the Magistrate’s decision, the District Court concluded that

notwithstanding Michael’s status as a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust, Sybil

Michael because Sybil had discretion
her beneﬁt.

that

(R., pp.

to invade the assets

867-869).” Based on

Michael had no probable cause

share 0f the Survivor’s Trust

this

t0 ﬁle the

aside,

it

to

0f the Survivor's Trust and use them for

dubious inference, the District Court concluded

Arizona Petition and he therefore forfeited his entire

by ﬁling such “placeholder”

the District Court ignored Michael’s argument that he

As an

owed n0 duty

action.

was

14

(R., pp. 869-72).

entitled to

Accordingly,

review “relevant” Trust

should be noted that the same dubious inference would be equally applicable to

all

of the

beneﬁciaries 0f the Sybil’s exercise 0f her power of appointment under Article Eight of her Will, including the
Sibling Trustees.

The Successor Trustees did not dispute
ofthe Arizona “statute of limitations”
see also Arizona

that the

(i.e.,

purpose for ﬁling the Arizona Petition was to avoid the expiration

the period for ﬁling and pursuing creditor’s claims). (R., p. 598

Code §§ 14-3803 and 14-3804.
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(1]

5));

administrative and ﬁnancial records, regardless 0f whether the records were created before 0r after

Sybil’s death. (R., pp. 869-74).

It

should be obvious that the Successor Trustees’ breached their duty t0 allow access to

“relevant” Trust records, thereby impairing administration of the Trust and giving rise t0 the need

to ﬁle the

Arizona Petition as a “placeholder.” The Successor Trustees had been in breach of their

duties for over ten

months before Michael was forced to ﬁle action 0n the Arizona Petition.” Had

they properly performed their ﬁduciary duty and accorded Michael access t0 relevant Trust
records, the Arizona Petition

appropriate procedure

may not have even been necessary. Under the

would have been

for the District Court to ﬁrst allow

records concerning Trust administration and

the Forfeiture Clause.

By

circumstances, a

Michael access t0 the

management before considering

so doing, Michael

more

would have been afforded a

the applicability of

fair

opportunity t0

determine whether or not there was indeed probable cause t0 pursue any claim against Sybil’s
estate.

If,

after

being given such

Sybil’s estate, that

Forfeiture Clause.

fair opportunity,

would have been
Distilled to

its

the

Michael then elected t0 pursue his claim against

more appropriate time

t0

examine the applicability of the

essence, the Trustees are attempting to use the in terrorem

provisions in the Forfeiture Clause as a club to impair proper administration 0f the Trust and t0

excuse their
relying

own breach of ﬁduciary duty. The District Court prematurely jumped from A to Z

upon

in

the Forfeiture Clause as a basis for refusing Michael access to Trust administrative

and ﬁnancial records.

15

The Idaho action was ﬁled on July

27, 2016, and the Arizona Petition

was

over ten months. (R., pp. 10, 466).
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filed

on

May

30,

2017— a period

of

C.

Application offhe Trust’s Forfeiture Clause t0 the Circumstances IS Inconsistent with the

Grantor ’s Intent and the Express Terms offhe

Trust.

The Successor Trustees have previously argued

that the

type 0f court action that Roger and Sybil sought to deter
[C1ause].” (R., p. 733).

p. 874).

The

District

If the Successor Trustees’

Forfeiture Clause

is

taken 0n

its

by including

Court apparently adopted

and the

face,

it

Arizona Petition

this

would mean

that Sybil

clause (c) in the Forfeiture

argument 0n

District Court’s overly

“is exactly the

its

face.

(See R.,

broad interpretation 0f the

had every

right t0 breach her

ﬁduciary duties to correctly allocate assets between the sub—trusts and to properly administer the
Trust assets, and then (by use of the Forfeiture Clause), Sybil 0r any successor trustee could
threaten forfeiture if any beneﬁciary sought t0 correct Sybil’s breach 0r otherwise enforce

performance of her ﬁduciary duties—regardless 0f how valid the claim might be. If that broad
interpretation of the Forfeiture Clause

is

correct, then

why

did Roger and Sybil self—impose

upon

the surviving grantor the ﬁduciary duty to properly allocate and administer the Trust for the beneﬁt

0f the beneﬁciaries?
illusory promise,

in the ﬁrst place?

Trust records.

If the beneﬁciaries’ right t0 a

Why did Roger and

proper allocation was nothing but a hollow,

Sybil bother t0 include the allocation provisions in the Trust

The same thing would be

true

of the beneﬁciaries’ right 0f access t0 “relevant”

Clearly, the District Court’s expansive interpretation

is

inconsistent With the

existence and performance 0f such ﬁduciary duties.

Here, Michael ﬁled the Arizona Petition in order to preserve a potential claim against
Sybil’s estate, based

upon improper

trust administration

by Sybil

beneﬁciary. The Arizona Petition was immediately stayed following
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its

after

Michael became a

ﬁling, in recognition that

in the absence

of access to

trust records,

had breached her ﬁduciary duties

to him.

was not

evident that Michael’s intent

Michael was not in a position to determine

Given the stay of the Arizona

t0 run

up

in Violation

of

§

18.10 of the Trust.

own

it

should be

self-

litigation costs in order to leverage a better

settlement offer from the Successor Trustees.

complaining 0f the consequences 0f their

Petition,

if in fact Sybil

Rather, the Successor Trustees are merely

actions in Violation 0f Idaho

Code

§

15-7-303 and

In sum, the Successor Trustees are attempting to use the

Forfeiture Clause t0 impair 0r abrogate their duty to allow access t0 Trust records, thereby
nullifying the beneﬁciaries’ rights t0 information, t0 proper administration, and t0 enforce other

express duties under the Trust.

III.

The

Court Erred in Failing t0 Address and Reverse the Magistrate’s
Conclusion That Michael’s Request for Financial Information Regarding the Manner
in Which the Allocation Was Made Between the Survivor's Trust and Marital Trust
Was Not Relevant t0 Michael’s Interest in the Survivor’s Trust.

A
“relevant

District

trustee is required,

information

administration.”

upon “reasonable

about the

Idaho Code

of the

assets

15-7-303(b)

§

requires the Successor Trustees t0

“make

request,” to provide t0 a trust beneﬁciary

(italics

its

and the particulars relating

added).

to

the

Similarly, § 18.10 0f the Trust also

the ﬁnancial records and documentation 0f the Trust

available to the beneﬁciaries at reasonable times and

beneficiaries.” (R., p. 294). In

trust

all

Memorandum

upon reasonable notice

for inspection

by the

Decision, the Magistrate stated that, “[Michael]

lacks standing to seek an accounting or any other relief for any period of time before Sybil

Ferguson’s death because [Michael] was not a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust
before Sybil Ferguson’s deat

.”

(R., p. 690).

The Magistrate

APPELLANT’S BRIEF PAGE

also concluded that,

34

at

any time

“The

clear

language 0f the Trust demonstrates that [Trustees] are correct in asserting that [Michael] lacks
standing to seek an accounting 0f the Original Trust, the exempt Marital Trust, the non-exempt
Marital Trust, along with prior records 0f the Survivor’s Trust, before Michael’s interest took

effect.” (See R., p. 693).

From

(R., p. 704). Unfortunately,

that determination,

0n appeal the

Michael ﬁled his appeal

to the District Court.

District Court failed t0 address the question

Michael’s request for access t0 Trust records sought “relevant” information. (See R.

As noted above, the Magistrate’s

interpretation is incorrect because

a beneﬁciary before Sybil’s death and there

is

nothing in the Trust

p. 872).

Michael in

itself

of Whether

fact

became

nor in Sybil’s Will

evincing an intent to limit the rights 0f beneﬁciaries of the Survivor’s Trust solely to inspection 0f
Trust records for the period after Sybil’s death.

The proper question should have been Whether 0r

not Michael’s request for access t0 Trust ﬁnancial records and in particular records relating t0 the
allocation

between the Marital Trusts and the Survivor’s Trust was “relevant”

t0 his interest in the

Trust“ and “directly applicable t0” Michael’s interest in receiving a proper share of the remaining
assets in the Survivor’s Trust, as provided

by Article

8 0f Sybil’s Will.”

in failing t0 ﬁrst address this issue before considering the applicability

Under

§ 5.02

trust entitled the “Survivor’s Trust,”

is

and were

t0

were

Court erred

of the Forfeiture clause.

to

be allocated to a separate

be administered as provided in Article 8 0f the

very parallel to and perhaps identical to the Court’s denial 0f Michael’s Motion to Compel answers
and Requests for Production of Documents, Which denial Will be addressed in Section IV,

to his Interrogatories

below.
17

District

0f the Trust, the surviving grantor’s interests in any community property of

the Trust and the surviving grantor’s separate Trust property

This issue

The

See Idaho Code

§

15-7-303 and § 18.10 ofthe Trust (R., pp. 293 -94).
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Trust Agreement.

(lie.

,

(R., p.

Section 5.02 also provided that the deceased’s grantor’s

271).

Roger’s) interest in any community property and separate property were t0 be transferred into

the Marital Trusts.

(R., p. 271).

Trust nor 0f the Marital Trusts.

Michael

initially

was not a beneﬁciary 0f either

when

Importantly,

Michael became a beneﬁciary 0f the Survivor’s Trust
Will.

(R., pp. 315-17).

Sybil exercised her

t0 the extent

the Survivor’s

power 0f appointment,

provided in Article 8 0f Sybil’s

Section 8.01(a) of the Will required distribution directly to Michael of

6,250 units 0f the Harquahala Valley Farms, LLC, subj ect t0 his payment of a portion share 0f the
death taxes attributable t0 the allocation 0f the

HVF Units

t0 him.

(R., p. 3 15).

Section 8.01(b)

further provided for distributions out 0f the Survivor’s Trust t0 certain designated grandchildren,

which

Michael and his siblings under

further reduced the balance of the assets distributable t0

§

8.01(c). (R., pp. 315-17).

Two
Trust.

things are apparent

First, the allocation

from the foregoing

scheme

distribution

relative t0 the Survivor’s

between the Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts was very

critical

because such allocation directly impacted the amount of money, property, assets and investments
contained in each of the sub-trusts. Secondly, Michael was not a beneﬁciary of the Marital Trusts,

Whereas the Sibling Trustees were. Therefore,

if there

was no

between the Survivor’s Trust and the Marital Trusts, such
allocation than they

were

entitled

to,

allocation 0r an improper allocation

that the Marital Trusts received a larger

Survivor’s Trust

would have been diminished

was comprised of a

sizeable fortune of assets located

the

accordingly.

The Roger and Sybil Ferguson

estate

primarily in Idaho and Arizona, the combined total of which Michael estimates would have
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exceeded seventy million dollars

Ferguson estate existing

at

Trusts. (See R., p.

240

(R., pp.

238-40

(W

6-8)).

Since most,

if not all,

0f the

Roger’s death was comprised 0f community property, approximately

one-half of the combined estate
t0 the Survivor’s Trust

in 1986.

(i.e.,

Sybil’s share 0f the

community property) should have gone

and the other one-half should have been distributed among the Marital

(1]

9);

see also R.,

p.

271 (Trust,

§ 5.02)).

How those allocations were made

signiﬁcantly affects the value of Michael’s one-fourth share of the balance remaining in the

Survivor’s Trust at Sybil’s death.

The

Trustees’ refusal t0 allow access t0 Trust records only fuels the suspicion that such

allocations, distributions

and administration have not been properly performed. The

District Court

should have therefore reversed the Magistrate’s ﬁnding that such information was not “relevant”
information under § 18.10 of the Trust 0r Idaho

Code

the enforceability 0f the Forfeiture Clause, Michael

to determine if Sybil

IV.

§

15-7-303.

By doing s0 before considering

would have been afforded a

had breached her ﬁduciary duties as a

fair

opportunity

trustee.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Allow Michael t0 Pursue Discovery Concerning
Have Reasonable Cause for

the Successor Trustees’ Claim that Michael Did Not
Filing a

On

Claim

in the

Arizona Probate Action.

September 25, 2017, Michael ﬁled a Motion

First Interrogatories

to

Compel

the Trustees respond t0 his

and Requests for Production of Documents dated April 28, 2017.

(R., p. 432).

Speciﬁcally, Michael sought an order from the Magistrate compelling the Trustees’ response t0
Interrogatories Nos. 6 through 11

(R., pp.

and Requests for Production 0f Document Nos.

1

through 10.

432-33; see also R., pp. 438-59 (Successor Trustees’ responses)). Such discovery sought

information concerning the manner in which assets 0fthe Trust were allocated between the Marital
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Trusts and the Survivor’s Trust and the administration 0f the assets in the Survivor’s Trust, 0f

Which Michael was a beneﬁciary.

(R., pp. 444-59).

The Magistrate denied such discovery on

Michael was not entitled

same erroneous premise

that

Sybil’s death because he

was not a beneﬁciary 0f the Trust and

to Trust records kept or created prior to

as such

Michael appealed that portion 0f the Magistrate’s ruling

p. 697).

pp. 708, 71

1).

the

had n0 “standing.”

t0 the District Court.

(R.,

(R.,

Ultimately, the District Court ignored that portion 0f Michael’s appeal and did not

address the discovery issue at

all.

(See R., pp. 861-75).

The scope 0f discovery includes any “matter

that is relevant t0

any

parties’

claim 0r

defense” as well as evidence that “appears reasonably calculated t0 lead t0 the discovery 0f
admissible evidence.” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The scope ofMichael’s discovery sought
Trust administrative records that

may have

allocations, accounting errors 0r perhaps

she

was

acting as the Initial Trustee.

demonstrated Sybil’s mismanagement, errors in asset

even breaches 0f ﬁduciary duties 0n Sybil’s part while

Such evidence was necessary to determine Whether the

initial

inventory was complete and accurate and whether the Trust had been administered properly.
other words, access t0 such information

to ensure the Trust

was necessary

t0 protect

In

Michael’s right as a beneﬁciary

was administered properly.

Importantly, Michael’s discovery requests were necessary for his ability to respond to the

Successor Trustees’ afﬁrmative defense and claim for a Declaratory Judgment (seeking to apply
the Forfeiture Clause). Speciﬁcally, the merits 0f Michael’s potential claims against Sybil’s estate

were put

into issue

When

the Successor Trustees

amended

their

Answer and

included, both as an

afﬁrmative defense and as a claim for Declaratory Judgement, a request for a determination that
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Michael had triggered the Forfeiture Clause by ﬁling the Arizona

Petition.

(R., pp. 426-29).

By

pleading such Afﬁrmative Defense and Counterclaim, the Successor Trustees put into issue the
question of Whether or not Sybil had breached her ﬁduciary duties while serving as an
Trustee and whether 0r not Michael had probable cause to

Restatement (Third) of Trusts
relative t0 the period

§

205.

Sybil’s ﬁnancial

commence

his

Initial

Arizona Petition. See

and administrative records 0f the Trust

of Trust administration prior to her death would have been relevant to

Michael’s defense t0 that counterclaim.

The Successor Trustees should not be allowed

t0

“sandbag” Michael’s discovery requests and then assert forfeiture because Michael has n0
evidence 0f “probable cause” 0f Sybil’s misfeasance 0r misfeasance.
In sum, the Magistrate and the District Court erred in not allowing Michael t0 pursue

discovery before ruling 0n the Forfeiture Clause issue.

V.

Because the Successor Trustees Breached Their Duty t0 Allow Michael t0 Inspect
Relevant Trust Administrative Records, They Should Be Barred under Equitable
Principles from Enforcing the Forfeiture Clause.

One of the most well-known and
seeks equity must d0 equity.” This

frequently applied equitable

maxims

maxim is an enforceable rule 0f law and is

is that,

“He who

applicable t0 every

kind of litigation:
It is

This

a

maxim of courts of equity that one Who seeks equity must do equity.
maxim expresses a cardinal, elementary, basic, and fundamental

one 0f the oldest, and best settled, maxims in equity
jurisprudence, and has been considered the source of every doctrine and rule
0f equity jurisdiction. It lies in the heart 0f equity.
principle.

It

It is

a favorite

and

is

is

maxim with a court 0f equity,

has been called

its

ﬁrst

maxim,

of extensive application, not being limited t0 any particular class of
0f cases Whenever necessary t0

cases, but being applicable to all classes
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promote

justice,

and

kind 0f

in every

and

litigation

t0 every species

0f

remedy.

The maxim

is

not a precept for moral observance, but an enforceable rule

of law.

30A

From

C.J.S. Equity § 102 (footnotes omitted).

have applied

this equitable

(1912); Failes

v.

maxim.

See, e.g.,

v.

v.

v.

Hood, 21 Idaho 709, 123

v.

Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755, 208

The Trustees here attempt

failure t0

P.

_,

Swanstrum, 66 Idaho 752,

Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954).

performance 0f a forfeiture unless the
Sullivan

Chaugh Nessy

P.

641

Weeter Lumber C0., Limited, 26 Idaho 367, 143 P.d 526 (1914).

Equity abhors forfeitures. Stringer
(1946); Graves

the earliest days 0f statehood, Idaho courts

168 P.2d 826, 830

Equity Will not grant speciﬁc

d0 so would lead to an unconscionable

result.

841 (1922).

t0 coerce Michael’s

submission by urging the Court t0 blindly

enforce the Forfeiture Provision, without looking at the underlying facts that precipitated ﬁling of
the Arizona Petition.

The undisputed

show

facts in the record before the Magistrate

that the

Trustees wrongly obstructed Michael’s right t0 access Trust ﬁnancial records and that Michael’s

ﬁling of the Arizona Petition was necessary in order to preserve the status quo until the Magistrate

had ruled upon Michael’s Idaho Petition seeking t0 enforce his
and ﬁnancial records.

The Trustees cannot have

it

right to access Trust administration

both ways, to wit: they cannot wrongfully

withhold the very records that would enable Michael t0 determine
administered, while at the

if the

same time coercively threatening him with

Trust had been properly

forfeiture

because of his

limited effort t0 preserve a potential claim for improper administration of the Trust.
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Michael

VI.

is

Entitled t0 an

Award

Based upon the Argument
appeal pursuant to Idaho

Trust,

Code

set forth above,

§ 12-121

Michael was clearly entitled

under Idaho Code

§ 15-7-303(b)

0f Attorneys Fees 0n Appeal.

and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. As a beneﬁciary of the

to inspect

and

Michael seeks an award 0f attorneys fees 0n

and copy Trust administrative and ﬁnancial records

§ 18.10

of the Trust, regardless 0f Whether he became a

beneﬁciary before 0r after Sybil’s death and the Trustees’ refusal

t0

The Successor

frivolous and without foundation in law 0r fact.

allow such inspection was
Trustees’ refusal t0 allow

Michael’s inspection 0f Trust records was also a clear breach 0f their ﬁduciary duties and impeded
the proper administration 0f the Trust.

if their

“N0

contest” and “exculpatory” clauses are not enforceable

enforcement would impede proper administration of the

liability

0n account 0f

their breach

0f ﬁduciary duty in bad

trust 0r shield the trustees

faith 0r

with indifference t0 the

purposes of the trust 0r the interests 0f the beneﬁciaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts

The Successor Trustees have not appealed

from

the District Court’s ﬁnding that Michael

§ 96.

became a

beneﬁciary of the Trust upon Sybil’s execution 0f her Will, and they have provided no reasonable
0r

good

faith

record access.

argument justifying

Under

their

breach 0f ﬁduciary duties regarding Michael’s right t0

the circumstances here, their wrongful actions clearly

impeded proper

administration of the Trust, thereby negating their ability to assert application of the Forfeiture

Clause.

Their failure to allow Michael access to Trust records and their refusal to respond t0

Michael’s discovery requests necessary t0 respond t0 the Trustee’s afﬁrmative defense and
counterclaim was frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.

awarded

to

Michael upon appeal under Idaho Code

§

Attorneys fees should be

12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Michael asks,

“What

are the Successor Trustees trying t0 hide?”

here seeks no binding interpretation of the dispositive provisions of the Trust and n0

occur

if

Michael

granted the desired access.

is

Michael

harm would

The Successor Trustees apparently have ready

access to those records,” and if as they contend, Sybil properly allocated her

community and

separate property t0 the Survivor’s Trust and properly administered Trust assets, then Michael’s

Arizona Petition Will likely go away. Michael has

many unanswered questions and concerns

With

respect to the identity and value 0f the assets in the Survivor’s Trust at Sybil’s death and with

respect to the

manner

in

which the Trust has been administered by his

siblings

and With respect

various assets that appear t0 have been omitted from the Interim Inventory provided t0

Successor Trustees.
that their Interim

19

to

him by the

Michael should not be forced t0 blindly accept the Successor Trustees’ claim

Accounting

is

accurate and complete, Without the ability to exercise his right to

examine the underlying documents and records 0f the Trust kept prior to and

The Successor Trustees’ duty under Idaho Code

§

after Sybil’s death.”

15-7-303(b) to provide the Trust

beneﬁciaries “with relevant information about the assets 0f the trust and the particulars relating to
the [trust] administration”

are equally clear.

It

is

is

very

clear.

The

Trustees’ ﬁduciary duties under § 18.10 of the Trust

undisputed that the Successor Trustees refused to provide ﬁnancial

18

See R.,

19

See R., pp. 242—52 (1m 14—29).

20

See R., pp. 207-14 (1m 10-15, 17 of the Afﬁdavit of David Smith, an Idaho certiﬁed public accountant, outlining
the reasons the interim accounting and inventory provided by the Successor Trustees is not complete and does

p.

515

(1]

9);

see also, R., p. 253

(1]

30).

not meet National Fiduciary Accounting Standards for ﬁduciary accounting).
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information and Trust records relative t0 Trust administration prior t0 Sybil’s death.

impeded the proper administration 0f the Trust and

their duties t0 Michael, the Successor Trustees

their resort to the Forfeiture

Michael access

Clause

is

premature and should not be allowed unless they allow

t0 those Trust administrative

opportunity to consider Whether there

is

The Court here should reverse

By breaching

and ﬁnancial records, thereby affording him a

fair

probable cause to pursue his claim in the Arizona Petition.

the District Court’s decision relative to the applicability of

the Forfeiture Clause under the circumstances

and remand the matter

to the trial court, With

an

order directing the Magistrate t0 order the Successor Trustees t0 allow Michael t0 review and copy
relevant Trust administrative and ﬁnancial records, consistent with the standards set forth in Idaho

Code
t0

§

15-7-303(b) and § 18.10 0f the Trust. The Court should also direct that Michael’s Motion

Compel discovery be granted and

further order that consideration of the applicability 0f the

Forfeiture Clause be deferred until the Successor Trustees have fully complied with Michael’s

discovery requests and after Michael has been afforded an opportunity to

make an informed

decision whether or not t0 proceed on his Arizona Petition. Consideration of the applicability of
the Forfeiture Clause should be permitted if and only if Michael elects t0 pursue his Arizona

Petition, after being afforded that opportunity.

fees

and costs 0n appeal pursuant

to Idaho

Code

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/s/ Dale W. Storer

Dale

W.

Finally,

Michael should be awarded his attorney

§ 12-121.

30th

day of July, 2019.

Andrew Rawlings
D. Andrew Rawlings, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,
/s/ D.

Storer, Esq.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO,

P.L.L.C.
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P.L.L.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I

hereby certify that on

this 30th

day of July, 2019, a true and correct copy of Appellant’s

Brief was properly mailed in the United States mail With postage prepaid and also served Via email

and

Idaho Rule for Electronic Filing and Service 17(c)(1) (as the attorney listed

fax, pursuant to the

below has

failed t0 designate a service contact); Idaho

Rule 0f Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C), —(E),

and —(F); and Idaho Appellate Rule 20, on the following:
Craig G. Taylor, ISB #4248

CRAIG TAYLOR LAW OFFICES, PLLC
North
P.O. Box 723
Rexburg, ID 83440
58 East

First

Telephone:

(208) 356-0180

Facsimile:

(208) 356-0238

Email:

crai2.tavlor.law@ gmail.com

Attorneyfor Respondents Lois C. Ferguson,
Wade Ferguson, J. Xarissa Koenig, and
Steven

J.

Hart

Andrew Rawlings
Andrew Rawlings, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
/s/ D.

D.
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